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ABSTRACT
This report shows that it is possible to negotiate and reach asymmetrical environmental
agreements that take into account significant national dissimilarities. The report argues
that analytical models and intuitively appealing model-based quantitative indicators of
national circumstances can establish premises for negotiations leading to differentiated
environmental agreements. While they cannot take the place of political negotiation,
they help identify a formula that defines the problem in a resolvable fashion and prevent
the bargaining space from expanding uncontrollably. Scholars arguing that symmetrical
environmental measures are widely used because they simplify negotiations and
prevent countries from pursuing extremist positions, and that salient focal points are
significant in negotiation, overlook this argument. In pre-Kyoto European Community
climate policy, which this article empirically examines, high transaction costs and EC
member states’ ability to block economically hurtful agreements were not essential
issues.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Global environmental problems are unintended consequences of economic development,
environmentally damaging technology, and population increase. As the global climate
protocol negotiations have shown, international environmental negotiations and
environmental treaties will increasingly need to take into account present and future
national dissimilarities in terms of wealth, economic structure, energy basis, population,
emphasis on environmental protection and perhaps other issues as well. The symmetrical
approach widely used in international environmental conventions disregards national
dissimilarities and might result in inefficient and unfair agreements and country obligations.
It may be an obstacle to international environmental cooperation, and government officials
and policy analysts have recently become interested in differentiated agreements reflecting
present and future national dissimilarities. The achievement of fairness and the need for fair
burden sharing have also been prominent issues in global climate negotiations and many
believe that differentiation is preferable compared to the routinely followed symmetrical
approach.
This report analyzes the recent climate policy negotiations within the European
Community (EC) that in March 1997 produced an agreement among the EC member
states on a differentiated or asymmetric negotiating position.1 Although differentiation is
generally considered unlikely to happen, this group of fifteen countries did manage to
differentiate their national environmental commitments and attempted to equitably share
the economic burden of climate protection. This successful attempt to differentiate raises a
number of questions: Who are the key actors in international processes of differentiation?
How do they facilitate the process of differentiation? How is a differentiation process best
structured? How are essential issues resolved? The EC climate policy decision of March
1997 offers a good opportunity to begin exploring these important issues.
I first briefly describe the EC decision of March 1997 to differentiate climate policy
targets among member states. Then follows a discussion of the advantages and
disadvantages of symmetrical and differentiated environmental agreements, in particular in
the context of climate policy. After the empirical study of the EC negotiations producing
the decision of March 1997, the empirical findings will be analyzed. I will finally discuss
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how differentiation could be achieved and how burden sharing arrangements are best
designed in the light of the EC experience. Hopefully the final section will draw useful
lessons on how differentiation of burdens of climate and environmental protection more
generally could be achieved in the future.
2 THE EC CLIMATE POLICY NEGOTIATING POSITION OF
MARCH 1997
The parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC)
agreed at the first Conference of Parties (COP-1), which took place in Berlin in the spring
of 1995, that the existing national commitments in the FCCC to protect the global climate
system were inadequate. They needed to be strengthened. Referred to as the Berlin
Mandate, it was decided that a protocol, or another legal instrument, specifying abatement
targets, policies and measures and time-frames for the industrialized countries should be
signed no later than December 1997 when COP-3 would convene in Kyoto, Japan. The
EC was an essential actor in the subsequent protocol negotiations and strongly wished to
play an "environmental leadership" role.2 The EC negotiating process and the
differentiated negotiating position reached in March 1997 was thus part of the broader
global negotiating process aimed at a Kyoto climate protocol.
Making a political move that greatly surprised many close observers and raised the
hopes of the international environmental community, the EC proposed in March 1997 that
the OECD countries cut their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 15 percent in 2010.
This became the toughest policy target proposed by industrialized countries in the protocol
negotiations. This interim EC decision meant, more precisely, that the member states
agreed to a negotiating position to reduce total EC emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2),
methane (CH4), and nitrous oxide (N2O) by 15 percent in 2010, compared to the 1990
emission levels.
Environmental ministers from the EC member states agreed furthermore that some
member states should reduce their GHG emissions, others should stabilize their GHG
                                                                                                                                      
1
 It is the EC, not the EU, which has the legal competence in the area of climate policy. See Macrory and
Hession, 1996.
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emissions, but that five member states would be allowed to increase their GHG emissions
by a certain percent. Thus, a considerable and quite complex differentiation of policy
commitments was achieved within the EC. Luxembourg had committed itself to cut
emissions by 30 percent; Portugal, however, was allowed a 40 percent rise (see Table 1).
It was decided in June 1997 that the total EC GHG emissions should be reduced by 7.5
percent in 2005, relative to the 1990 levels.3
Table 1. Changes in emission levels in 2010 relative to 1990 levels (in %) allocated EC
member states in March 1997.
Country National emission target
Belgium  -10
Denmark  -25
Germany  -25
Greece +30
Spain +17
France     0
Ireland +15
Italy    -7
Luxembourg  -30
Netherlands  -10
Austria  -25
Portugal +40
Finland     0
Sweden   +5
UK  -10
Source: Council of the European Union, 7 March 1997.
The EC decision of March 1997 is noteworthy for two reasons. First, as
already mentioned, burden sharing was a significant issue both in the EC climate
negotiations and the global protocol negotiations. A number of industrialized countries
hoped for differentiation of climate policy obligations of all the industrialized countries,
not just within the EC. Second, the EC Large Combustion Plant (LCP) directive to
limit acid emissions (1987) discussed below is the only prior example of a
differentiated agreement reached within the EC. The EC agreement of March 1997
should therefore be considered a historic decision in the context of EC and
international climate policy as well as a significant decision in the area of EC
environmental policy.
                                                                                                                                      
2
 For the development of the "environmental leadership" concept as an element of the EC political
response to global warming, see Jachtenfuchs and Huber 1993.
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3 SYMMETRICAL VIS-À-VIS DIFFERENTIATED
ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS
International negotiations seldom produce differentiated environmental commitments
among industrialized countries.4 Reaching international environmental agreements of
significance is in itself a demanding and complex task. However, due to national
dissimilarities or asymmetries, symmetrical environmental agreements often distribute
burdens unevenly across countries. Considerable dissimilarities exist even within a
relatively homogeneous group of countries such as the EC. Why, then, do not countries
instead differentiate obligations? As discussed below, the explanations for the widespread
use of symmetrical environmental agreements basically make two arguments.5 First,
countries prefer symmetrical agreements. Second, differentiating commitments will often
be an insurmountable challenge because of the complexities that are introduced into the
negotiation process. Consequently, symmetrical measures are widely used in
environmental conventions and treaties, but differentiated agreements will remain
exceptions.
Symmetrical agreements seemingly impose similar and equal obligations on those
countries that are bound by them. They contain identical behavioral proscriptions and
prescriptions for all. The signatories are to take "similar steps", for instance ceasing
commercial whaling, adopting the polluter pays principle, or phasing out ozone-depleting
substances. Such across-the-board measures treating all countries in the "same way" are
well-known examples of the symmetrical approach to national obligations. In the climate
policy area, a prominent example is the oft-repeated proposal that all countries should
reduce GHGs emissions by the same percent relative to a specified base year.
One advantage of the symmetrical approach is that it reduces information
requirements on governments. Negotiating differentiated agreements would become
extremely time-consuming and technically complex if many countries were making
individual proposals for national and collective obligations. This would result in an
extreme expansion of the bargaining space, without guaranteeing that negotiations would
be completed successfully. Symmetric agreements would therefore be preferable in
                                                                                                                                      
3
 Council of the European Union 19/20 June 1997.
4
 Differentiating between industrialized and developing countries, however, is quite widespread.
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situations where differentiation seems technically unfeasible, and when the "route" of
differentiation seems uncertain and might lead to unattractive outcomes. During the global
protocol negotiations Germany highlighted some well-known concerns about technical
feasibility: "We foresee enormous practical difficulties and obstacles in identifying the
relevant factors affecting the emissions of different greenhouse gases, in deriving
corresponding indicators, in generating reliable and comparable data needed, and, last but
not least, in weighting these indicators (...) Parties therefore would come up with very
different proposals according to their individual circumstances and capabilities. This
approach would mean even more complicated and lengthy negotiations without necessarily
ensuring a more equitable outcome."6 By contrast, the expectation of a symmetrical
agreement imposing equal proportional obligations serves to narrow the bargaining space
and focuses negotiations on the common level of reductions that all will be bound by.
In this line, scholars emphasize that high transaction costs make it unlikely that
countries will pursue and reach differentiated agreements. Several have underlined that it
took five years of negotiation, often twice-weekly and among a quite homogeneous group,
to agree on the differentiated targets in the EC LCP directive.7 Although primarily
examining negotiation strategies for reaching global agreements among industrialized and
developing countries, and underlining that differentiation at a global level would encounter
even bigger political and technical obstacles, they conclude that countries’ ability to block
a costly EC climate agreement together with high transaction costs make it most unlikely
that the EC could agree to differentiate national climate policy obligations.8
Still another advantage is that the symmetrical approach discourages countries
from making extreme proposals for differentiated obligations intended to serve their self-
interest by putting heavier burdens on others. By understating their own ability to make
necessary changes and overstating the ability of others, countries might hope that a
differentiated agreement will be relatively less burdensome for themselves. The
presumption of equal measures will discourage use of this self-serving strategy and
                                                                                                                                      
5
 Parson and Zeckhauser 1995.
6
 German Delegation, 6 March 1996. As an example of an unattractive outcome, the EC opposed
differentiation within the OECD in the protocol negotiations because the issue was expected to derail the
negotiations and result in a less ambitious climate protocol. The EC did accept OECD-wide differentiation
in Kyoto, however.
7
 Grubb, 1990, 72; Parson and Zeckhauser 1995, 88; Sebenius 1995, 54.
8
 In addition to the references in footnote (7), see also Wagner 1997, 324-325. Scholars stress the UK’s
blocking power in the negotiations on the LCP directive. See U.S. Congress 1994, 11.
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countries will instead make more reasonable proposals that are acceptable to themselves
and, by implication, others similar to them. Unfortunately, this often leads countries to
propose and adopt international environmental rules, norms and obligations at the level of
the lowest common denominator.
Symmetrical agreements often come about as a result of the pull or "guiding force"
which focal points exert on negotiators.9 The expectations of governments tend to
converge on salient focal points, even when agreement close to a focal point would be
preferable from the viewpoint of economic efficiency or scientific knowledge.
Environmental treaties therefore typically contain identical round number obligations. One
example is the 1987 North Sea Conference’s ministerial declaration with respect to land-
based marine pollution sources which urges countries to aim for "a substantial reduction
(of the order of 50%) in total inputs…between 1985 and 1995."10
It should be underlined, however, that a symmetrical agreement might not always
be as unfair as it first appears to be. Countries that are very concerned about an
environmental problem are often willing to pay more relative to less concerned countries.
For example, in the early 1970s, industrialized countries were more concerned about
ocean dumping than developing countries.11 When it was decided to prohibit ocean
dumping of heavy metals, industrialized countries were willing to incur pollution
abatement costs, even though developing countries, which did not ocean dump heavy
metals, would not incur economic burdens as a result of international agreement. In some
situations, the pollution control costs imposed by a symmetrical environmental agreement
might roughly correspond to countries’ willingness to pay for environmental protection.
Finally, countries might prefer a symmetric agreement if differentiation would
unacceptably increase their obligations and create heavier burdens. Differentiation is
fundamentally a zero-sum game. Assuming that a group of countries intends to reduce a
given total amount of emissions, the less GHG emissions a country reduces, the more
emissions others will have to reduce, and vice versa. Consequently, countries are as much
concerned about the obligations of others as about their own. Sometimes differentiation
                                               
9
 For focal points, see Shelling 1960, 1980, 70.
10
 Ministerial Declaration 1987, 9.
11
 Ringius 1992.
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might make it possible to increase coordination benefits that will reduce the net economic
costs of differentiation, but it nonetheless largely remains a zero-sum game.12
In summary, scholars argue that the rare use of differentiated environmental
agreements is a consequence of how symmetric agreements simplify negotiations by
reducing the bargaining space. Also countries have a common interest in preventing
individual countries from pursuing extremist negotiation positions at the expense of others,
and salient focal points have a significant impact on negotiations. With respect to EC
climate agreements more specifically, there is general agreement that differentiation of
national obligations within the EC would be unlikely due to high transaction costs and
member states’ ability to block agreements that would hurt them economically.13
Ideally, complete differentiation would imply that national obligations perfectly
match asymmetries across countries. Seen from the economics viewpoint, it would be
optimal if obligations perfectly reflected asymmetrical abatement costs because emissions
would then be reduced as cheaply as possible. Moreover, identical abatement cost for all
countries, some argue, is the most fair and equitable.14
The possibility of setting the collective target above the lowest-common-
denominator level is another significant advantage of differentiation. Cuts in a few
countries might be sufficient to reach a modest common abatement target, but an
ambitious target can be achieved only if many countries cut emissions. At the same time,
the more GHG emissions a country can reduce, the more it can contribute toward a
common goal, and even though small emitter countries contribute only little or nothing,
countries contributing considerable amounts of reductions make it possible to raise the
target. How much a country contributes basically depends on the population size, the
carbon-intensity of the energy system, the structure, the size and the growth of the
economy, and the ambitiousness of its climate policy. Large emitters, who often will be
significant political and economic actors in their own right, will play a key role. As
illustrated by the United States’ position in the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, however, it
                                               
12
 For example, removal of fossil fuels subsidies would presumably reduce GHG emissions, would be
economically beneficial, and international trade distortions might be prevented, if this is done in a
coordinated fashion by a group of countries. See, for example, Ruijgrok and Oosterhuis 1997.
13
 Haigh, however, has outlined a possible “top-down” approach to EC differentiation in which the
Commission, possibly in an informal way, sets legally binding targets for member states. “The
negotiations may need to be based on some attempt at an objective evaluation of what fair burden sharing
should entail.” Haigh 1996, 173.
14
 For fairness principles discussed in the context of climate policy, see Ringius, Torvanger, and Meze 1996.
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cannot be taken for granted that large emitter countries always are willing and able to "go
first" by aggressively cutting emissions. And, evidently, a large emitter country can only
offset, but not eliminate, GHG emissions from a small emitter country.
Still another advantage is that differentiation enhances participation, and perhaps
cost-effectiveness, in climate agreements. Because of national dissimilarities, countries are
not able to contribute equal amounts of GHG emission reductions. Also, their
contributions will vary over time. Those countries that are able to reach an ambitious
target might want others to make a similar contribution, but it will often be impossible for
others to commit themselves to the same target. Thus it would be better if targets reflect
dissimilar opportunities for abatement across countries. As often noted, when national
targets reflect national circumstances, it becomes possible for more countries to participate
in international efforts to control and reduce GHG emissions.15 Furthermore, international
mechanisms reducing low-cost GHG emissions in developing countries and formerly
centrally planned economies, especially joint implementation and international trade in
emission permits, could significantly increase the cost-effectiveness of international
cooperation in climate protection.
Yet another, more political advantage of differentiation is that a group of countries
setting an ambitious environmental target and demonstrating willingness and ability to
achieve it may act as lead countries. The group increases the political pressure on other
countries to set a similarly stringent environmental target.
Differentiated obligations in the climate policy area will most likely reflect that the
opportunities and constraints regarding control of GHG emissions vary from one country
to another. Because high abatement costs are often taken to imply that a country has fewer
opportunities for reducing emissions compared to countries where abatement costs are
lower, abatement costs will likely be used in comparisons of opportunities and constraints
in various countries and in differentiating national obligations. National obligations also
have to reflect countries’ willingness to reduce emissions. All else equal, countries that
take a strong pro-environment stance and reduce emissions vigorously want comparatively
ambitious obligations. It is unlikely that less environmentally concerned countries accept
similar obligations to reduce emissions. An asymmetric distribution of obligations will
                                               
15
 The Financial Times wrote at the time of the last pre-negotiation round before Kyoto: "The Kyoto
meeting has more chance of success if it seeks a formula of equality of effort. A pledge by each nation to do
what it can may produce better results than a target that is widely ignored." October 14, 1997, 17.
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therefore be most satisfactory when it reasonably reflects both dissimilar abatement costs
and dissimilar preferences for reducing emissions. If not, agreement is unlikely because
differentiation will be perceived to be economically unfair and in discord with countries’
environmental policies.
The national energy basis has important implications for countries’ ability to reduce
GHG emissions. It will be relatively more costly for countries depending heavily on
nuclear power, hydro-power and other non-fossil fuels in their national fuel mix if all
countries have to cut emissions by the same percent – if, in other words, a symmetrical
agreement is established. All else equal, countries relying heavily upon non-fossil fuels will
want to reduce less than if they had more fossil fuels - oil, natural gas, and coal - in their
national fuel mix. It is therefore quite likely that they wish to reduce less than those
countries they themselves and others compare them with, and that it is considered
reasonable that countries depending greatly on non-fossil energy have less stringent
targets. Conversely, because GHG emission reductions will not be as costly for them,
countries emitting large amounts of GHGs are more likely to aggressively reduce
emissions, and it is probably expected that they will reduce more than other countries. Pro-
environment countries whose emissions are considerably higher than average may in
particular want to cut emissions. They might therefore make a larger contribution than
other, seemingly comparable countries.
Essentially, differentiation poses the challenge of constructing asymmetrical
obligations that reasonably reflect significant national dissimilarities and at the same time
achieve a collective target. To differentiate, a group of countries first must reach
agreement on a collective policy target. Second, assuming everyone intends to contribute
to the achievement of the target, it is necessary to identify the way(s) in which the total
collective commitment could be distributed fairly and feasibly within the group. Third, the
group will need to allocate the contributions to the group members, most likely through a
negotiation process.
Although negotiating in good faith, any group of countries intending to
differentiate obligations is facing significant political and intellectual obstacles. Regarding
the latter, it becomes necessary to develop a framework consisting of a set of "objective"
criteria on the basis of which differentiated national obligations can be constructed
systematically. The framework and the set of criteria should make it possible to construct
national obligations reflecting significant dissimilarities and similarities across countries.
CICERO Report 1997:8
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The framework will need to include those issues that countries agree are most significant,
and obligations reflecting to what extent countries are alike or dissimilar must then be
constructed and developed systematically. Accordingly, it seems necessary to
operationalize the framework and the selected “objective” criteria, and choose quantifiable
indicators of national circumstances.
Needles to say, there are potentially many ways of identifying and comparing
dissimilarities. Countries might disagree on which dissimilarities are important and which
are insignificant, and it becomes important to have agreement on those criteria or issues
that should be used in comparing countries. In the case of climate policy targets, the
differentiation criteria agreed upon in the Berlin Mandate mentioned above include
economic structure and energy basis.16 The global climate negotiations have also
underlined differences with respect to wealth and countries’ preferences for environmental
protection. Consequently, it seems crucial to establish a framework and a set of criteria
aimed at developing country obligations that reflect national circumstances such as wealth,
structure of economy, national fuel mix, and environmental policies.
National obligations do not automatically emerge even though countries share
notion(s) or standard(s) of fairness in a particular negotiating context. Economic analysis
and energy modeling will probably play a key role in providing information about the
economic costs of achieving a collective environmental policy target and abatement costs
of individual countries.17 In the policy area of climate protection, a number of sectors,
policies and measures should be examined in order to produce relevant cost estimations. A
large number of detailed studies might be available, and it will often be necessary to
synthesize existing economic information and distill input from studies. Negotiators and
decision-makers are primarily generalists, not specialists, and governments will often
employ expertise from universities, consultants and research institutions to synthesize
knowledge and develop qualitative energy indicators and differentiated national targets.
However, in order to reach agreement, considerable emphasis on simplicity is important.
                                               
16
 See in particular article II.2(a). FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.1, 6 June 1995. The Berlin Mandate makes
reference to the Climate Convention, which draws attention to countries with fossil fuel dependant
economies.
17
 For example, for the use of energy modelling (the “RAINS” model) in negotiations on long-range
transboundary air pollution controls in Europe, see Gehring, 1994. For a discussion of the use of analytical
models in negotiations, see Sebenius 1981.
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It will be necessary that frameworks for differentiation help make comparisons
both among countries and among economic sectors within individual countries. Countries
will want to know whether national contributions and obligations are comparable and
proportional. Negotiators will probably find relatively uncomplicated differentiation
criteria identifying and justifying dissimilar obligations on the basis of dissimilar economic
sectors and countries the most appealing. Also, they will probably best be able to survive a
negotiation process and resist the pressure of national self-interests.
As the above discussion shows, the symmetrical and the differentiated approach
both have advantages and disadvantages. However, the question of how differentiated
agreements are established has so far not been explicitly addressed and empirically
documented. How is it possible to reach a differentiated agreement? Who are the
significant actors? How do they facilitate the negotiation process? Which are the key
challenges? Differentiation constitutes a formidable challenge, both politically and
intellectually. By examining how the EC reached the climate policy decision of March
1997, we will gain useful knowledge about how differentiated agreements are reached and
how negotiation processes should be designed in order to reach differentiated
environmental agreements.
4 EC CLIMATE POLICY AND BURDEN SHARING
Already when the EC became involved in the global climate negotiations in the early
1990s, the member states and the Commission realized that some sort of internal
differentiation would be necessary to reach agreement within the EC. Hence, a number of
proposals for EC burden sharing were developed before and after the establishment of the
FCCC in 1992. It was not until March 1997, however, that the EC reached a formal
differentiated agreement.
Early on, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, the so-called cohesion countries,
were concerned that the EC’s climate policy could negatively affect their development.
They believed that it would be necessary to take into account their need for economic
development. They were in fact hoping for lighter burdens compared to the richer member
states. Spain had resisted common standards in the negotiations on the LCP directive, and
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vigorously defended the poorer member states.18 It suggested the formulation in the
Council Decision of 1992 declaring: "[…] countries with, as yet, relatively low energy
requirements, which can be expected to grow in step with their development, may need
targets and strategies which can accommodate that development, while improving the
energy efficiency of their economic activities."19 Other member states insisted on
improving energy efficiency in cohesion countries but acknowledged, since the cohesion
countries had fewer resources and legitimately needed economic development, the
reasonableness of distinguishing between themselves and the cohesion countries. Although
no official document was ever produced, the member states reached a common
understanding and informal agreement that lesser burdens should fall on cohesion
countries relative to other member states.
The Commission dealt with the question of burden sharing at several occasions in
the 1990s. In 1990 and 1991, Draft Communications suggested that the share of emissions
and wealth should determine the allocation of emission targets to member states.20 The
Commission distinguished between three groups of member states with different
obligations. Member states emitting above the EC average - Germany, the Netherlands
and Denmark - should reduce emissions by 5 percent relative to the 1990 levels. A group
of member states emitting around the EC average - Luxembourg, Belgium, the UK, Italy
and France - should stabilize their emissions at the 1990 level by 2000, and the cohesion
countries would be allowed to increase their emissions by 15 percent relative to the 1990
level.21 But France, Italy and the UK resisted this idea, which they thought was unfeasible,
and a Council meeting in October 1991 decided instead in favor of financial assistance to
the cohesion countries. The assistance would be provided by the Structural Funds and the
Cohesion Fund established by the Maastricht Treaty.22
The Commission believed that it was necessary to take into account the
development concerns of the poorer member states when it later developed a proposal for
a CO2/energy tax. In order to accommodate the interests of the cohesion countries, which
otherwise would withhold their political support, the commission proposed compensation
                                               
18
 For the negotiations on the LCP directive, see Héritier, Knill and Mingers 1996, 184-208.
19
 Haigh 1996, 162. The conclusions from the EC Environment Council in March 1997 contain an almost
identical wording. Council of the European Union, 7 March 1997, 6.
20
 Jachtenfuchs and Huber 1993, 48-49.
21
 Notice that Luxembourg, Belgium and the UK emitted above average, measured per capita.
22
 For the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund, see Laffan 1997.
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payments under a burden sharing scheme. This would imply that the EC provided "funding
to offset the global economic costs of the tax and other measures within the CO2 strategy
package for the less developed EC member states."23 The issue of burden sharing was
again addressed in a Commission document prepared for an EC summit in Essen in 1994.
This document suggested that finances from the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund
of the Maastricht Treaty should be used to achieve a fair treatment of Greece, Ireland,
Portugal and Spain.24
The EC target to stabilize CO2 emissions in year 2000 at 1990 levels, which was
agreed to in October 1990, implicitly acknowledged the need for differentiating the
member states’ obligations. The EC stabilization target was not premised upon a careful
and systematic review of existing and future potentials for stabilizing and reducing CO2
emissions within the EC. Rather, after a pledge-and-review round in which member states
described their expected energy use and trajectories of GHG emissions until 2000, it
seemed feasible, primarily because Germany expected significant emission reductions, to
stabilize the total EC emissions in year 2000. This "bottom-up" approach raised the
question whether a genuine EC policy in the area of climate protection existed at all. It
was evident that the cohesion countries would increase their emissions over this period.
In short, how climate policy obligations could feasibly be shared among the EC
member states became an essential issue as soon as the EC began responding at the policy
level to the climate change issue in 1990. Despite this, and although a number of common
statements and various proposals were generated, no substantial political progress was
achieved on the issue until 1997. However, when the EC became involved in the global
protocol negotiations, which, as mentioned, began after COP-1 in the spring of 1995, it
was necessary to revisit the critical and complex issue of burden sharing. Because a
possible future protocol was expected to reduce, not just stabilize, GHG emissions, and in
order to identify individual countries’ legally binding targets, the EC had to work out a
formal agreement on burden sharing among the member states. The climate policy targets
of the member states in 1995 are shown in Table 2.
                                               
23
 Héritier, Knill and Mingers 1996, 312.
24
 Huber 1995, 19.
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Table 2. Climate policy targets of EC member states in 1995.
Germany 25% CO2 Reduction from 1990 by 2005
Austria 20% CO2 Reduction from 1988 by 2005
Denmark 20% energy-based CO2 Reduction from 1988 by 2005
Luxembourg 20% CO2 Reduction from 1990 by 2005
Belgium 5% CO2 Reduction from 1990 by 2000
The Netherlands       Stabilize CO2 by 1994-1995, 3-5% reduction from 1989-1990 by 2000
                                 10% CH4                               Reduction from 1990 by 2000
                                 Stabilize N2O emissions on 1990 level by 2000
Finland                     Stabilize energy-based CO2 on 1990 level by 2000
Italy                          Stabilize CO2 on 1990 level by 2000
Sweden                     Stabilize fossil energy-based CO2 on 1990 by 2000, and reduce post-2000
                                 30% CH4 from landfills      Reduction from 1990 by 2000
United Kingdom       Stabilize greenhouse gases on 1990 level by 2000
France                      Maintain annual CO2 emissions per capita below 7.33 ton CO2
Greece 15% CO2 Increase from 1990 by 2000
Ireland 20% CO2 Increase from 1990 by 2000
Spain 25% energy-based CO2 Increase from 1990 by 2000
Portugal 40% CO2 Increase from 1990 by 2000
Source: European Commission, 1996. However, Germany’s target has been corrected. For Spain’s
target, see FCCC/IDR.1/ESP, 10 July 1996.
5 "TOWARDS A EUROPEAN CONSENSUS " IN DUBLIN
During the 1996 Irish Presidency, a Community climate policy workshop titled "Towards
a European Consensus" was held on 2-3 September 1996 in Dublin, Ireland. The
workshop focussed on national circumstances, such as energy-efficiency differences in
various economic sectors, and also looked at policies and measures to reduce GHG
emissions within the EC. The workshop brought together the negotiators from the member
states participating in the EC Ad Hoc Group on Climate, officials from the Commission’s
Environment Directorate General (DG XI), Dutch energy policy advisors and a
professional facilitator.
DG XI presented a 3-page proposal for an EC target of 10 percent in year 2005
and burden sharing among member states in Dublin. It was suggested that nine member
states would reduce CO2 emissions, a smaller group would stabilize emissions, and two
cohesion countries could increase emissions somewhat.25 DG XI had estimated
contributions of CO2 emissions from the energy and transformation sector, the industry
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sector, the transport sector, and the commercial/institutional/residential sectors. But most
of the member states preferred a common 2005 target to be around 5 percent, and did not
support the Commission’s proposal. As a DG XI official noted later, the Commission
proposal for differentiation was rather similar to those obligations member states agreed to
in March 1997.26 However, the DG XI proposal set a too ambitious common target,
appeared to be ill prepared, and was not persuasively presented in Dublin. For these
reasons, especially the lack of substantive content, the proposal failed to build consensus
among the member states. Explained an astute Irish negotiator: "The proposal did not
have the necessary intellectual rigor."27
DG XI strongly urged the EC to play a leadership role at the global level. DG XI
was particularly concerned about the political credibility of the EC target. Significantly,
because of the national targets for 2005 set by Germany, Austria, and Denmark, and
expected CO2 reduction in the UK due to the conversion from coal to gas, considerable
future GHG reductions seemed very likely. In fact, these member states would alone
almost achieve what would be needed to reach a 10 percent EC wide reduction by 2005.
This would mean that the member states without national targets could increase their
emissions and did not need to take any efforts towards reduction. DG XI concluded: "It
would therefore politically not be credible to propose less than a 10 % EC wide reduction
of GHG emissions."28 Hence, throughout the EC negotiation process, DG XI stressed that
a politically credible EC target for year 2005, or later, should be no less than 10 percent.
A professional facilitator participated in the Dublin workshop. At the initiative of
the facilitator, the negotiators informally indicated what they thought would be a suitable
EC CO2 policy target for the year 2010. The responses of the member states were
represented by marks placed at points along a line indicating the percent size of an EC
wide reduction target and showed that they preferred a target for year 2010 to be
somewhere in the range of 10-20 percent. It also seemed clear that a majority would prefer
an EC wide target of about 15 percent. The EC negotiation process would in that case
need to distribute approximately 15 percent of the total CO2 emission in 1990, i.e. around
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493 million tons CO2, plus possible increases in emissions in the 1990-2010 period, among
the member states.29
The climate issue was discussed when EC environment ministers met in mid-
October 1996. Ministers stressed the importance of the Commission’s contribution to the
negotiations on a protocol, and "the Presidency called on delegations to work actively on
this issue in order to reach conclusions at the Environment Council in December."30 But
when environment ministers met on 9-10 December in Brussels it quickly became clear
that the member states rejected the Irish Presidency’s proposal of a 5-10 percent reduction
in 2005 and a 10-20 percent reduction in 2010, relative to the 1990 emission level.31
Because of lack of agreement, the EC was still unable to present a proposal for a
protocol and could therefore not assume a leadership role in the global climate
negotiations. Consequently, the political pressure to find a solution to the burden sharing
issue was increasing significantly. The only remaining realistic opportunity to reach an
agreement was the EC environmental ministers meeting in March 1997.
6 THE TRIPTIQUE APPROCH
The Netherlands hoped to be able to resolve the burden sharing issue within the EC during
its 6-month Presidency period beginning on 1 January 1997. The Dutch strategy for the
EC climate target negotiations was developed well ahead of the Dutch Presidency period.
An essential feature of the strategy was to follow a sectoral approach to these negotiations
rather than one analyzing member states as “black-boxes”. With hindsight, choosing this
approach was perhaps not surprising, as there appeared to be general agreement among
involved government officials in several member states that a sectoral approach seemed
most promising. Some policy experts and specialists had examined OECD-level allocations
of climate policy targets that were based on indicators of energy-efficiency and countries’
contributions of GHG emissions, in particular CO2 emissions per GDP and CO2 emissions
per capita. But such approaches seemed to be too complex, aggregated and insensitive to
national differences to be of use in climate negotiations.
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The Dutch environment ministry commissioned energy expert Kornelis Blok and
his colleagues at the University of Utrecht to help develop a useful sectoral approach.
Blok and his colleagues, who had participated in the Dublin workshop, provided EC
climate negotiators with expert input about policies and measures to limit and reduce
GHG emissions within the EC.32 The EC Environment Council had in December 1995
decided that the "equitable sharing of the objective within the Community should be
discussed and agreed in parallel with the decision on proposals by the Community for
quantified reduction objectives and polices and measures for inclusion in the protocol."33
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the EC had made little progress on the burden sharing issue by
focusing on measures and policies. Instead, more emphasis on burden sharing seemed
necessary, as well as a new approach to the issue.
The Dutch government initiated such a new approach, namely "The Triptique
Approach." Bert Metz, the chief Dutch government participant in climate negotiations at
the EC and the global level, was the primary architect of the Triptique Approach. The
Approach was intended to make the member states reach an agreement both on a total
EC-wide abatement target and on individual national targets. Previous attempts to reach
agreement within the EC pointed towards the necessity of the total EC abatement target
and the national shares being negotiated together. An EC agreement was reached in 1996
on stabilizing CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere below 550 ppmv, i.e. approaching
twice the pre-industrial concentration level of 280 ppmv.34 The member states failed,
however, to reach an agreement on national targets. Indeed, high-level Dutch government
officials concluded that the EC negotiation process, instead of separating these issues,
should directly couple the size of a total EC target with the size of national contributions
to the total EC target.
The Dutch negotiators intended to design an approach to the EC burden sharing
negotiations that was quite simple, at least in the beginning.35 The approach should be able
to accommodate national circumstances to a reasonable degree, but should avoid creating
insurmountable requirements for data and projections of future developments. The
                                                                                                                                      
31
 Europe Daily Bulletin, No. 6870, 9 December 1996.
32
 Blok and Phylipsen 1996; Phylipsen and Blok 1996.
33
 Council of the European Union, 7 March 1997, 3.
34
 Parts per million (106) by volume.
35
 As Metz later underlined, the Dutch government followed the so-called  "KISS principle" ("Keep it
simple, stupid") when developing the Triptique Approach. See Alfsen, Ringius and Torvanger 1997, 26-27.
CICERO Report 1997:8
22
Triptique Approach separated the national economy into three broad sectors; the light
domestic sector, the energy-intensive, export-oriented sector, and the electricity
generation sector.36 CO2 emissions per capita from the domestic sector did not vary
significantly across member states, although the cohesion countries in general emitted less.
In the case of the heavy industry and the power generation sectors, however, considerable
differences existed across the EC.
Before deciding to follow the Triptique Approach, Dutch officials and the Utrecht
University experts had experimented with alternative approaches dividing the economy
into either two or four sectors. It did seem necessary to separate the electricity sector from
the rest of the economy. The EC moved in the 1990s toward establishment of an EC-wide
electricity market, but, although a significant development from the perspective of climate
and energy policy, it was not for this reason that the Triptique Approach singled out the
electricity sector.37 Rather, power production is an essential sector from the perspective of
controlling GHG emissions, and fuel shares in the electricity sector varied significantly
from one member state to another. For example, Sweden and France depended greatly on
carbon-free nuclear and hydro-power; Danish and German electricity production was
heavily coal-based. By singling out the electricity sector, the Triptique Approach clearly
demonstrated, and in effect justified, distinguishing between various countries when setting
targets. It was partly for political reasons that the energy-intensive, export-oriented
industries were singled out in the Triptique Approach. These industries had been strongly
opposed to the carbon/energy tax first proposed by the Commission in 1992 and had
therefore been granted partial or total exemption from the tax until major OECD countries
would adopt comparable measures.38 By setting identical "targets", or “allowances”, for
energy-intensive, export-oriented industries across the EC, it was hoped that the Triptique
Approach could avoid disruptive export and trade effects due to climate policy. This could
minimize opposition from the member states.
The domestic sector was defined to include households, services, light industry,
agriculture, and transportation. The heavy industrial sector consisted of the following
industries: building materials, chemical, iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, pulp and paper,
refineries, coke ovens (if they were not a part of the iron and steel industry), gasworks and
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other energy transformation branches, electricity generation excluded. The third sector, as
mentioned earlier, was power generation. National obligations for the member states
would be calculated by adding up individual allowances calculated for each of the three
sectors and by taking into account economic growth, population changes and climate-
adjusted energy-use (heating and cooling). The sectoral allowances would not be regarded
as sectoral targets themselves.
A per capita approach was used to calculate emission allowances in the domestic
sector. The Triptique Approach assumed that these emissions would converge at an equal
level in year 2030 in the member states, and that emissions allowances per head should be
identical in all EC countries in 2030. The allowed per capita emissions in 2010 were
calculated by linear interpolation from 1990 per capita emissions to the common
converging emissions level in 2030. Corrections were made for climate differences
influencing the energy demand across the EC, and for expected population changes.
Energy efficiency improvement targets were established for heavy industry.
Taking the existing sector structure as a reference point, a common growth rate of 1.2
percent was assumed for all countries. To this was added the same energy efficiency
improvement rate (0.66 percent per year between 1990 and 1995, and 1.2 percent, or 1.5
percent, per year between 1995 and 2010). These assumptions about growth rate and
energy efficiency improvement rate were in accordance with the projections in a widely
accepted DG XVII (Energy) business-as-usual scenario, the so-called Conventional
Wisdom scenario.39 It was furthermore assumed that industry in all member states would
decarbonize fuels, i.e. switching from fossil to non-fossil fuels, by 0.17 percent annually.
The largest differences existed in the electricity sector. For this reason, a so-called
tailor-made approach, combining a county-to-country approach and general guidelines,
was followed. The guidelines implied that growth in electricity consumption should be
limited to 1 percent annually; however, the cohesion countries were allowed a growth rate
of 1.9 percent in order to create more leeway for economic development. By 2010, use of
renewables should increase by 8 percent, use of coal and oil should be reduced to 70
percent of the 1990 levels, nuclear energy should be used in accordance with national
preferences, and the use of natural gas should be increased. It was emphasized that
member states were free to choose their preferred combination of options.
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7 THE ZEIST WORKSHOP
The 30-page report on the Triptique Approach was presented for the first time at an
informal workshop organized by the EC Ad Hoc Group on Climate on 16-17 January
1997 in Zeist, the Netherlands.40 This was the first time that actual individual targets for all
fifteen member states were presented.
The report outlined four different variants. In variants I and IA, domestic sector
emissions would be reduced by 10 percent by 2010 compared to 1990, an annual energy
efficiency improvement of 1.2 percent from 1995 to 2000 in the heavy industry would be
achieved, and emissions from power production would be reduced as described above.
The significant difference between I and IA was that national climate targets for Denmark,
Germany, Austria and Sweden for year 2010 were included in alternative IA. These
national targets were a 25 percent reduction in Austria and Denmark, a 30 percent
reduction in Germany, but a 5 percent increase in Sweden.41 Variant I would mean an EC-
wide reduction target of 9 percent; IA would mean a reduction of 14 percent (see Table
3).
In variants II and IIA, domestic sector emissions would be reduced by 15
percent by 2010 compared to 1990; an annual energy efficiency improvement of 1.5
percent would be achieved from 1995 to 2000 in heavy industry. There were no
changes in the electricity sector compared to I and IA. Variant II would mean an EC-
wide reduction target of 13 percent; IIA would reduce by 17 percent.
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Table 3. Climate targets for the member states in each of the four variants
COUNTRY      I      IA        II      IIA
Belgium     -12     -12     -15     -15
Denmark     -12     -25     -14     -25
Germany     -17     -30     -20     -30
Greece      +2      +2       -2       -2
Spain    +11     +11      +6      +6
France       -4       -4     -12     -12
Ireland       -2       -2       -5       -5
Italy       -5       -5       -9       -9
Luxembourg     -17     -17     -20     -20
Netherlands       -6       -6       -9       -9
Austria       -1     -25       -5     -25
Portugal    +21     +21    +16    +16
Finland       -4       -4       -7       -7
Sweden    +26      +5    +22      +5
United Kingdom     -17     -17     -20     -20
EC       -9     -14     -13     -17
Source: Blok et. al 1997, 14.
Not surprisingly, the Triptique report gave rise to discussion. Member states raised
questions about the sectoral approach and how the report dealt with the agriculture and
transportation sectors, the share of electricity in space heating, previous member states
efforts, and climate corrections. The Austrian delegation, for example, would have
preferred that the transportation sector be singled out as a separate sector. However, the
meeting agreed that the approach seemed highly useful. Thus, a Swedish negotiator
concluded: "The approach presented a new, promising angle on the whole question of
burden sharing."42 Although they thought that some would object to the report’s sectoral
approach, and somewhat doubted if it was "fair" to add the unilateral national
commitments to their share of the EC commitments the way this was done in the Triptique
Approach, Danish government officials completely supported the Dutch approach.43
Member states in general were satisfied with the report, and none of them fundamentally
questioned the usefulness of the three-pronged Triptique Approach. They all stressed that
the decision on differentiation was political and could not be made on the basis of a
“mechanical formula.”44
The Zeist workshop did not attempt to reach agreement on a total EC target and
burden sharing on the basis of the four variants. In fact, there was no detailed discussion of
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the percent targets allocated to the individual member states. The Utrecht University
experts explained that the scenario targets indicated the amounts of GHG emissions they
concluded could feasibly be achieved, based on analysis of the specific circumstances of
member states in various economic sectors and sub-sectors. Belgium, which thought that
its target was too stringent compared to the Netherlands, came to the conclusion that its
target was feasible and would not mean a comparatively heavier burden. Significantly,
however, cohesion countries objected to their targets, which they thought were too
stringent, and argued that they needed more allowances for future emissions. Not
surprising, given the lenient attitude of the Netherlands towards the poorer member states,
the Dutch sympathized with the concerns of the cohesion countries and appeared willing
to propose less stringent targets for them.
Because of "The Triptique Approach" report, the Zeist workshop successfully
managed to establish an objective technical framework within which national targets and
contributions as well as collective commitments were proposed. It forced the member
states to think concretely about their targets and contributions, and "accelerated the
process of differentiation."45 The Triptique Approach "set the premises" for the subsequent
negotiations inside the EC.46 While organized as an informal, technical workshop, the Zeist
meeting therefore marked a decisive political step towards climate policy differentiation
within the EC.
8 THE EC ENVIRONMENT COUNCIL MEETING
Shortly after the informal workshop in Zeist, the member states received a letter from the
Dutch environmental minister, Margreeth de Boer, proposing EC wide reduction targets
and a burden sharing arrangement for member states. The letter underlined the urgency of
reaching an EC negotiating position.47 It was proposed that the EC would commit itself to
10 percent reduction by 2005 and 15 percent reduction by 2010 at the March
Environmental Council meeting. The proposal for burden sharing focused on 2010, "in
order not to complicate the decision any further and because the precise burden sharing for
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the reduction that will be agreed in Kyoto has to be determined at that time" (see Table 4).
De Boer further explained that interim targets for the year 2005 could be deducted from
the 2010 targets. The minister concluded by reiterating the importance of EC leadership in
the protocol negotiations and contributions from all the member states: "A challenging
period is ahead of us and I firmly believe the world is looking to the European Union to
play an ambitious leading role in the international negotiating process. That role can never
be more than the sum total of the commitments individual Member States are willing to
make."48
Table 4. The Netherlands presidency proposal for national emission reduction targets for
year 2010.
Member States Emission index
2010 (1990=100)
Belgium            85
Denmark            75
Germany            70
Greece          105
Spain          115
France            95
Ireland          105
Italy            90
Luxembourg            60
Netherlands            90
Austria            75
Portugal          125
Finland            90
Sweden          105
United Kingdom            80
Source: Letter from Ministry for Housing, Planning and the Environment, 27 January 1997.
Evidently, despite rounding the national targets to the nearest 5 or 10 percent
points, the Dutch proposal was built on the targets developed in the Triptique Approach.
Significantly, as had been made clear at the Zeist workshop, the Dutch Presidency
proposal took into consideration the concerns of the cohesion countries. As a result of
these target modifications, it would be possible for these member states to increase
emissions. On the other hand, Finland, Italy and the Netherlands would have to reduce
further emissions. The differences between the Netherlands Presidency’s proposal and the
Triptique Approach are shown in Table 5.
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Table 5. Difference between presidency proposal and Triptique targets
Country       I      IA       II    IIA
Belgium     -3      -3       0       0
Denmark   -13       0    -11       0
Germany   -13       0    -10       0
Greece    +3     +3     +7     +7
Spain    +4     +4     +9     +9
France     -1      -1     +7     +7
Ireland    +7     +7   +10   +10
Italy     -5      -5      -1      -1
Luxembourg   -23    -23    -20    -20
Netherlands     -4      -4      -1      -1
Austria   -24       0    -20       0
Portugal    +4     +4     +9     +9
Finland     -6      -6      -3      -3
Sweden   -21       0    -17       0
UK     -3      -3       0       0
The Dutch proposal was examined by the Ad Hoc Group on Climate at its meeting
on February 17-18, 1997. It now became obvious that a number of the member states
considered their proposed national targets too ambitious and unfeasible. In fact, a majority
of member states wanted their targets to be less stringent and adjusted with what they
perceived to be realistically achievable (see Table 6). Consequently, at this point the total
reachable EC target for year 2010 was about 11 percent, or 4 percent below the target
proposed by the Netherlands.
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Table 6. Comparison between presidency proposal and member states’ informal pledges49
(A) 2010
Presidency proposal
All climate gasses
(B) 2010
Informal pledges from
member states at Ad
Hoc Group meeting
17-18 February 1997
Difference
(B)-(A)=
        INDEX            INDEX     INDEX
Belgium              85                 90         +5
Denmark              75                 75           0
Germany              70                 75         +5
Greece            105             (110)         +5
Spain            115               115           0
France              95                 95           0
Ireland            105             (110)         +5
Italy              90                 95         +5
Luxembourg              60                 70       +10
Netherlands              90                 90           0
Austria              75                 75           0
Portugal            125             (125)           0
Finland              90               (95)         +5
Sweden            105               105           0
UK              80                 90        +10
EC-15              85                 89         +4
Compared to the technical meetings of the EC Ad Hoc Group on Climate, the EC
Environmental Ministers Council politicized the negotiations considerably. The political
pressure was increased further because the meeting took place just previous to a new
round of global negotiations beginning on 3 March 1997, in Bonn, Germany. The final
national targets and the EC wide target were uncertain. However, there was a real
possibility that the 15 percent target would not be reached. Some of the biggest European
contributors in an absolute sense, namely Germany, UK and Italy, seemingly wanted to
lower their national targets, while no member countries were opting for more ambitious
national targets.
Despite these uncertainties, however, an analysis made by the Danish negotiators
clearly showed that a well-demarcated bargaining space had been constructed by following
the Triptique Approach.50 The analysis basically identified three possible final negotiated
outcomes. A first possible outcome would be similar to the informal pledges that the
member states made in mid-February at the Ad Hoc Group on Climate. It would mean an
EC wide target of approximately10 percent. This outcome identified what the Danish
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negotiators considered to be the "baseline" of the EC negotiations: a situation of non-
cooperation in which individual member states primarily followed their own interests with
little regard for the preferences of others. This would be the outcome if a significant
number of member states did not compromise and refused to make comparable or
proportional contributions – that is, they would not be "fair" and contribute to an equitable
distribution of obligations. Conversely, the Danish negotiators perceived the Dutch
proposal for a 15 percent EC wide target and its burden sharing arrangement to be the
upper bound. Thus the Dutch proposal demarcated what appeared as the maximum
feasible given the configuration of interests among EC member states.
The Danish negotiators then compared two negotiated outcomes to the negotiation
"baseline." They referred to a second EC negotiated outcome as "Possible Compromise."
This outcome would be furthest away from the Netherlands Presidency proposal. In the
"Possible Compromise", Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK
would adopt positions close to their informal pledges made in the Ad Hoc Group on
Climate, and the total EC emissions would be reduced by 13 percent. A third negotiated
outcome, termed "Fair Burden Sharing", came closer to the Presidency proposal and
would produce a 14 percent reduction in total EC emissions. "Fair Burden Sharing"
implied raised targets for Belgium, the UK, Finland, France, Italy and Netherlands. Seen
from a Danish perspective, it was the positions of these six member states that determined
whether the final outcome would reflect fairness or self-interest. The targets of the
cohesion countries, which were almost identical to the Dutch proposal, remained
unchanged in the three negotiation scenarios forecasted by the Danish negotiators.
When EC environmental ministers met in March, a number of member states
believed that their targets were too ambitious and wanted adjustments in line with what
they considered to be more realistic. By now, it was evident that the final EC wide target
could be lower than 15 percent and, crucially, below 10 percent. The German
environmental minister and the Commission in particular emphasized that a common EC
target below 10 percent would mean that the EC position in the global negotiations was
not politically credible. Again, it was strongly stressed that all member states needed to
contribute as much as possible.
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Although the Netherlands had successfully accelerated the process of
differentiation within the EC, and had earned the respect of many European negotiators,
member states were dissatisfied with the Netherlands’s self-imposed target. In fact, a
number of member states believed that the Dutch commitment of 10 percent was
insufficient, if not self-serving. Germany therefore opposed the Dutch proposal for a 30
percent reduction, which set Germany’s contribution at an additional 5 percent over its
domestic target of 25 percent. 51 UK and Belgium also responded to the perceived low
Dutch target.52 UK wanted to contribute only 10 percent, not 20 percent as suggested by
the Netherlands, and Belgium decided to contribute 10 percent, instead of 15.53 Thus, both
countries adopted a target similar to the Netherlands. France and Finland both committed
themselves to a stabilization target, not a reduction target.
Although it was acknowledged that they necessarily would increase their
emissions, the cohesion countries were under significant political pressure to limit their
increases as much as feasibly possible. Other member states believed that the cohesion
countries jeopardized the EC negotiating position by cutting back their national
targets, and a negotiation breakdown was a real possibility. Some member states found
it particularly unacceptable if emission increases in cohesion countries would make it
impossible to reduce total EC emissions by 10 percent by 2010. The cohesion
countries would, if negotiations broke down, be publicly criticized for their lack of
willingness to cooperate and their disregard of the global warming issue. The Irish and
especially the Spanish accepted the targets proposed by the Dutch, but Greece and
Portugal lowered their targets significantly. In the end, six member states reduced their
targets even further (see Table 7).
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Table 7. Comparison between presidency proposal (I) and member states’ targets (II)
Country I. Dutch
proposal
II. National
emission
Target
Difference
     I-II=
Belgium      -15      -10       +5
Denmark      -25      -25         0
Germany      -30      -25       +5
Greece       +5     +30     +25
Spain     +15     +17       +2
France        -5         0       +5
Ireland       +5     +15     +10
Italy      -10        -7       +3
Luxembourg      -40     - 30     +10
Netherlands      -10      -10         0
Austria      -25      -25         0
Portugal     +25     +40     +15
Finland      -10         0     +10
Sweden       +5       +5         0
UK      -20      -10     +10
Because of the cuts in member states’ targets, the reachable EC target was reduced
by about 5 percent to 10 percent reduction in year 2010. A political problem immediately
arose as a 10 percent reduction target was perceived to be insufficient to influence the
positions of the United States and Japan in the protocol negotiations. A solution lacked at
first. The Netherlands proposed to adjust the EC target downward by 3 percent to a 12
percent reduction with accompanying adjustment of national targets. However, Denmark’s
environment minister, Svend Auken, proposed an acceptable solution. Auken suggested to
hold the 15 percent target and accept the 10 percent “shared-out” contributions as an
interim solution.54 Moreover, the EC, in case the Kyoto target exceeded 10 percent, would
distribute the remaining emission reductions after Kyoto.55
The 10/15 proposal was finally accepted because it was seen as important, if not
essential, that the EC target was both politically credible and ambitious.56 Moreover,
because the negotiators believed that the Kyoto target might be less stringent than 15
percent, the unusual 10/15 negotiating result was not expected to compromise the position
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of the EC in the global negotiations.57 The EC would, in case there was agreement on a 15
percent cut in Kyoto, subsequently negotiate a distribution of the remaining 5 percent. The
member states believed that those policies and measures that they were in the process of
implementing, or soon would implement, could achieve a total reduction of 10 percent
within the EC. If necessary, implementation of common and coordinated policies and
measures (CCPMs) would achieve the residual 5 percent.58 Consequently, national targets
and the EC target would primarily be achieved by national measures. The member states
were confident that they would be able to reach their targets.59
By differentiating the obligations of member states, the EC achieved its external
political objective: injecting new energy into the global negotiations on the Kyoto
Protocol.60 The outcome of the EC negotiations made it possible to increase political
pressure on other industrialized countries. In the summer of 1997, the president of the
European Commission, Jacques Santer, and European leaders criticized the positions of
the United States and Japan. At the G-8 meeting in June, the French president, Jacques
Chirac, declared: "The Americans are the biggest polluters."61 "We in Europe have put our
cards on the table," British Prime Minister Tony Blair said at a UN Earth Summit in New
York. "It is time for the special pleading to stop and for others to follow suit."62 The EC
maintained its leadership role in the final phases of the global negotiations up to the Kyoto
Protocol.
9 FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
Contrary to the predictions of most analysts and scholars, the previous section shows that
differentiation of national commitments is achievable in the EC policy area of climate
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protection. This case could even be seen as evidence that it is impossible to reach
agreement on symmetrical climate obligations, primarily because the considerable
asymmetries in the climate policy area make differentiation necessary.63 The EC
constitutes a relatively homogenous group of industrialized countries, and, as the Kyoto
Protocol shows, differentiation should therefore be even more likely at the OECD level:
the Kyoto Protocol targets range from a 10 percent rise (Iceland) to a 8 percent cut,
largely in the EC and economies in transition; the U.S. reduction target is 7 percent, and
Japan’s 6 percent.64 Unlike the EC agreement, however, the Kyoto targets were reached
through an "inductive" negotiation process; in other words, countries “put the agreement
together piecemeal, building it primarily through mutual compromise or exchanged
concessions on specific items.”65
As the EC process shows, differentiation will not necessarily result in an
uncontrollable expansion of the bargaining space. The EC avoided many of the pitfalls
identified by governments and analysts. Informal agreement was achieved on a set of
quantifiable indicators of national circumstances which made it possible to develop
national and EC contributions; emphasis was put on simplicity and "learning by doing"; the
task of developing energy indicators and policy targets was delegated to a group of
independent experts, not individual member states; a "menu" of EC climate policy
scenarios and national and common targets was developed; expert proposals for targets
could be revised in the light of better knowledge of national circumstances; and, finally,
targets developed by experts served as the starting points, rather than end-points, of a
negotiation process.66
National characteristics and significant national concerns within the EC were taken
into account in designing the Triptique Approach and in structuring the negotiation
process. As mentioned, the Triptique Approach assumed that CO2 emissions per head
from the domestic sector in member states should converge to an equal level in 2030. This
approach reflected the French, Portuguese and Spanish views, namely that CO2 emissions
per capita should be chosen as an indicator of national obligations.67 Paralleling the
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emphasis that especially Denmark, the Netherlands and Germany put on improving energy
efficiency, the analysis of the heavy industrial sector assumed that the member states
moved toward the same energy efficiency level in this sector. Also, as there was general
agreement within the EC that the cohesion countries should carry lesser burdens, the
Triptique Approach assumed a higher growth rate in electricity consumption in these
member states. Thus, rather than choosing a single indicator at the level of individual
member states (e.g. CO2 emissions per person or per GDP), the Triptique Approach
combined several energy indicators at the level of sectors. In this way the approach shifted
the attention away from comparing contributions and fairness among member states to
instead comparing sectoral contributions and fairness across sectors within the EC. When
developing climate policy, it is necessary to examine opportunities for GHG emissions
reduction, including the scope for behavioral changes, at the sectoral, not the national
level, and the Triptique Approach took a significant step in this direction.68
Experienced and skillful Dutch negotiators and energy experts played a vital role
by developing a suitable conceptual framework for differentiation and by identifying what
could be considered fair and appropriate targets. The Triptique Approach accomplished
two things at the same time; it defined both the anthropogenic sources of global climate
change and suggested a reasonable fair distribution of responsibilities among countries. It
diagnosed the climate change problem in a politically acceptable way and provided a
framework for differentiation of targets. Zartman has generalized this way of reaching
agreement as "deductive"; first "identifying a formula that defines the problem in a
resolvable way, and then translating the principles of the formula into specific details of
implementation."69
This case strongly suggests that it is necessary to negotiate national and collective
targets together. Countries will not agree on a collective target as long as national
implications and obligations are uncertain. In the case of the EC, a facilitator assisted in
identifying the boundaries of the collective political willingness and an EC target reflecting
an average of the member states’ preferred EC targets served as a reference point when
energy experts constructed asymmetrical national contributions. Potentially unproductive
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negotiations on a common target were thus avoided and alternatives to lowest common
denominators and salient focal points were constructed.
The EC negotiations were conducted primarily among three distinct groups of
member states. The first group, which, for lack of a better phrase, might be called the "rich
and green" EC member states, consisted of Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the
Netherlands and Sweden.70 Although they most likely would incur considerable abatement
costs as a result, they set themselves ambitious domestic targets and wanted the EC to
vigorously attack the global warming problem and play an environmental leadership role in
the global climate process.71 In general, the "rich and green" member states quickly
respond to perceived environmental problems by setting ambitious targets ahead of others.
They subsequently try to pressure and persuade other member states to imitate their level
of environmental protection.
Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the UK might then be described as the
"rich but not-so-green" member states.72 The cohesion countries, the poorer countries,
constituted the third group. Significant variations in abatement costs largely explain the
deviations in the case of climate policy – the Dutch, Finnish, French and Swedish targets –
from this generally observed pattern in EC environmental negotiations. Noteworthy,
although adding more political emphasis on climate protection, the accession of Austria,
Finland and Sweden to the EC in 1995 did not significantly influence the differentiation
process compared to earlier.
Regarding the differentiation process as such, rather than the structure of positions
created by the member states, the previous section documented that the "rich and green"
Netherlands and Germany played essential, but different, leadership roles. As I argued
earlier, differentiation creates a significant conceptual and negotiation challenge as it is
necessary to identify important national dissimilarities and suggest politically acceptable
objective criteria as well as quantifiable indicators for the purpose of international
comparison of countries. Thus, differentiation creates a demand for two distinct types of
leadership; intellectual and entrepreneurial leadership.73 The intellectual leader influences
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how negotiators perceive and think about important issues on the negotiation table; the
entrepreneurial leader is a skillful broker among actors and a shrewd designer of
acceptable negotiation solutions. Evidently, the Netherlands acted as both intellectual and
entrepreneurial leader in the EC differentiation process. Germany, however, played the
role of structural leader, the third primary type of leadership. This leadership type stems
from an actor’s ability to provide the material resources, in this case considerable amounts
of GHG emission reductions, which are necessary to achieve international agreement and
reach a common target. In fact, Germany alone contributed approximately 253 million
tons CO2 necessary to reach the common EC target, or around eighty percent of the
emissions (see Fig 1).74
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Figure 1. March 1997 EC negotiating position - percent distribution of CO2 emissions
reductions within the EC.
Evidently, bargaining power and political pressure play a significant role when a
group of countries negotiate national targets in a differentiated environmental agreement.
In the case of the EC, a symmetric climate agreement at the level of the lowest common
denominator was unacceptable to major European powers. At the same time, they
acknowledged that economic development inevitably would increase emissions in the
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cohesion countries, and urged these member states to increase energy efficiency. Lead
countries will attempt to make others contribute their "fair" shares. Indeed, it is essential if
laggards are able to block agreements.
The case documents different negotiation games within and among the three
distinct groups of countries. By self-imposing stringent climate targets, Austria, Denmark,
Germany and the Netherlands had in a sense their hands "tied". They shared an interest in
providing prestigious environmental leadership at the EC and global level, and would
undermine their political credibility as lead countries if they had lowered their targets
during the negotiations. In addition, climate protection was a significant environmental
issue in these member states and such a move would therefore be politically unattractive.
Differentiation was a necessity in order to set an ambitious EC target, primarily based on
Germany’s contribution of emission reductions.
The "rich but not-so-green" member states, by contrast, had not committed
themselves to specific targets beforehand. They mutually adjusted their targets over the
negotiation process, and an entirely different group dynamic evolved as a result. As
described, Belgium and the UK responded to the Dutch contribution, which they perceived
to be insufficient, by adjusting their national targets downwards.75 Within this group, a
pronounced tendency to adjust obligations to the level set by the least ambitious member
and adopt symmetrical obligations is observable. The "rich and green" member states did
not succeed to persuade or pressure the "rich but not-so-green" member states.
Comparison with the Presidency Proposal and the expectations of the Danish negotiators
indicates that most of these member states did not shoulder their presumed fair share of
the burden within the EC.
Some of the poorer member states, however, adopted more stringent targets as a
result of the EC climate policy negotiations. The differentiation process influenced Spain’s
target in particular. Although rejecting the Dutch proposal, Portugal changed its national
target from a 40 percent increase in 2000 to instead a 40 percent increase in 2010
(compared to 1990). The EC’s scientific, technological and financial assistance to the
cohesion countries makes them dependent on other member states and vulnerable to
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political pressure, and this explains why the EC membership has made the cohesion
countries adopt environmental standards that were more stringent than their own national
measures.76
Theories of international environmental negotiations and differentiation pay much
attention to side-payments.77 Linkages to non-climate issues were not made, however, nor
were package deals constructed in order to make less climate ambitious member states
raise their targets. "This is not how Brussels works", responded a German negotiator
when asked about the use of linkages to other EC policy areas and package deals in the
negotiations.78 As well, the leader countries did not apply any form of direct sanctions or
economic incentives, but instead attempted to persuade, pressure and shame others into
following their policy. Although some member states believed that the Structural Funds
and the Cohesion Fund would cover some future abatement costs incurred by the poorer
member states, these funding possibilities were never explicitly addressed and did not
influence the EC negotiations. While it was expected that each member state contributed
according to its ability to reduce, the cohesion countries were treated more leniently.
Fairness mattered and member states made comparisons between and within groups of
comparable countries.
Despite different levels of concerns among the member states, there was strong
agreement that the EC would have to deal with global climate change both internally and
through international leadership. As mentioned, especially Germany, the Netherlands and
Denmark, and DG XI, vehemently stressed the need for establishing an ambitious EC
climate policy. Negotiators from member states were thus under considerable pressure to
reach an agreement, especially after environment ministers failed to reach agreement in
December. Early failures and the deadline created by the pace of the global negotiation
process both were essential when an agreement was finally reached in March 1997.79
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The Commission did not exert a strong direct influence over the differentiation
process.80 As described earlier, DG XI advocated an ambitious climate policy and
Commission officials involved in renewables and energy-efficient technologies seemed
favorable towards this policy. However, DG XVII opposed an ambitious policy and
energy models in DG XVII indicated that implementation of an aggressive climate policy
most likely would create significant economic costs. The multi-sectoral climate issue
divided the Commission, especially DG XI and DG XVII.81
The leader countries were concerned about the conflicts within the Commission.82
However, they could not influence the internal politics of the Commission. Although they
would had preferred that the Commission had played a much more progressive role and
exploited its potential for influence better, they saw no way to interfere with such
supranational power struggles. In general, DG XI did not seem closely involved in the
global climate change issue, but gave higher priority to local and regional environmental
problems. Since 1992, the Commission had played a less active role in the climate policy
area.83
Nonetheless, by providing energy studies that created a backdrop to the
negotiations, the Commission played a constructive role. Compared to earlier, more
knowledge existed about the opportunities and barriers for achieving emissions reduction
in member states, especially the poorer ones. The Triptique Approach benefited from
improvements in EC energy modeling achieved since the early 1990s, especially European
Energy to 2020. But the Commission did not have the flexibility needed in order to tailor
an approach to EC burden sharing within a short period of time. Indeed,
a Dutch high-level official emphasized: "The Commission is much too bureaucratic and
slow-moving to play such a role."84
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10 BUILDING DIFFERENTIATED CLIMATE REGIMES
Possibilities for differentiation will greatly depend on the number and characteristics of
countries. In general, the larger and more diversified the group of countries, the more
necessary and more complicated it will be to differentiate. Moreover, there will be more
interests to accommodate within larger groups.
Regarding climate negotiations within the EC and the burden sharing issue, two
general observations are relevant. First, the question of responsibility for the historical
cumulative GHG emissions, i.e. the historical emissions added over time, played no role in
the negotiations. Second, neither was the issue of adverse climate change impacts (e.g.
flooding of coastal areas or ecosystem damage due to temperature increase) significant.
Developing countries, however, mostly focus on the historical GHG emissions and the
adverse effects of climate change in developing countries. Climate negotiations will
obviously be more complex if these asymmetries play a role.
Countries will follow either a deductive or a less systematic inductive approach to
differentiation. Below I focus on the deductive approach and industrialized countries.
Diagnosis in the prenegotiation phase is needed to make the climate issue
negotiable
The three initial steps in a differentiation process are to set a common target, develop a
conceptual framework for differentiation, and choose criteria for comparison of
contributions of countries. Before that, in the prenegotiation phase, it will be necessary
to define the climate problem so that it is negotiable and potentially resolvable.85 It is
usually in the prenegotiation phase that analytical models can help bargainers develop
the overall formula that forms the basis for agreement.86 Analytical models can thus
help “diagnosing” the problem, but are unlikely to be significant once the problem
definition or formula is established. Governments will be the key actors when
contributions are distributed among countries.
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Quantified indicators of national circumstances will be preferable to technical
formulas and rules
It appears very useful to develop quantified indicators of national circumstances. It is
possible to develop reasonably useful energy indicators for a relatively small, homogenous
group, such as the EC. It might be quite difficult for a larger, more heterogeneous group,
such as the OECD.87
The EU-differentiation process shows that a few, intuitively appealing quantitative
indicators at the level of economic sectors can usefully guide negotiations on differentiated
targets. Proposals for differentiation will be most useful when they are thoroughly
prepared, apply reasonable energy indicators based on reliable, available and comparable
data, build upon detailed knowledge of national circumstances et cetera.88 DG XI’s
proposal for differentiation did not generate sufficient attention because it, in addition to
being tabled too early in the EC negotiation process, was technically inadequate. Energy
models and energy scenarios will stimulate learning among negotiators and, because they
might shape common perceptions of policy opportunities and constraints, could facilitate
climate negotiations.
It seems that quantitative indicators of national circumstances might assist
negotiators more than mathematical formulas and burden sharing rules.89 First and
foremost, mathematical and technical rules seem unable to take into account all significant
national circumstances.90 Because countries quite simply are too different, it might be
impossible to determine national contributions on the basis of a set of quantified indicators.
Moreover, it is evident that rules cannot take into account unquantifiable factors, for
example foreign policy goals, which countries care about in climate negotiations.
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Furthermore, differentiation by technical formula could greatly complicate negotiations by
increasing their technical and scientific content.91 "They [burden sharing formulas and
rules] never give us a number", explained a German negotiator. "We need a percent!"92
Differentiation will in the end be decided through a political process, not a technical one,
involving pressures and offers. For such reasons, it seems likely that countries will prefer a
more flexible approach of negotiating differentiated targets directly with others.
Start early but wait for “ripe moments” and policy windows
National negotiators in the EC generally were cautiously optimistic regarding possibilities
for differentiation. It should be underlined, however, that the member states had tried for
more than five years to adopt an EC climate policy before they managed to work out a
differentiated arrangement. Good knowledge of national circumstances is necessary in
order to develop quantifiable indicators. Developing and collecting relevant knowledge
and data takes time, although it is essential.93
Time will also be necessary for sufficient awareness and pressure to build up. The
global climate problem is not yet considered an essential environmental problem, although
awareness of the problem presently is increasing. Increasing awareness will influence
national policies and, if societies’ preparedness to pay for climate protection increases,
expand the range of reduction options.
Last but not least, it will be important to seize the “ripe moment” for differentiation
of targets.94 Although their occurrence is notoriously difficult to identify beforehand,
negotiators should use policy windows and “ripe moments” to table target proposals.95
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Even highly useful indicators and skillful leaders will fail if the climate change problem is
attracting little attention among governments. Negotiation is both an art and a science, and
negotiators will have to act on intuition and rely on their training and experience when
hoping to take advantage of a “ripe moment” for reaching agreement.96
11 CONCLUSIONS
The question of how much individual member states should contribute to the EC climate
policy has been important ever since the global warming issue appeared for the first time in
the EC context. This report has focused on how differentiated national targets are
developed, how alternatives to lowest common denominators and influential focal points
are constructed, how model-based indicators can establish the premises for negotiations,
and how differentiated targets can create a bargaining space. While the total reduction
target may be a salient focal point, national obligations are results of negotiations mediated
by energy models and cost assessment studies.
Both domestic and international political processes influence national climate
policy. Because this report primarily focussed on the EC process, less attention was paid
to how countries develop their domestic targets, or why countries reacted as they did
towards the targets developed in the differentiation process. These issues need to be
examined further. It is evident, however, that the Triptique Approach influenced member
states significantly, in particular the cohesion countries. The Netherlands acted as an
intellectual and entrepreneurial leader, while Germany was a strong structural leader.
The report shows that three factors strongly influence climate policy targets,
namely ambitiousness of environmental policy (the "greenness" of a country), wealth, and
costs of environmental protection - in this case GHG abatement costs. This is not
surprising. It is less clear, however, how much these factors individually mattered when
the EC member states agreed to differentiate their commitments. These questions should
be examined further. It will in addition be necessary to learn more about how other
economic and trade interests influence differentiation of climate policy targets. Exporters
of fossil fuels fear that they will loose income because the demand for fossil fuels is
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expected to decline as a consequence of international climate policy; exporters of
environment-friendly technologies and know-how, by contrast, view climate protection as
a business opportunity. It is highly likely that also such economic aspects influence policy
targets and state positions in international negotiations.97
_____________________________________________________________________________________
This report draws upon a number of personal interviews conducted in 1997-1998 with researchers,
government officials in Denmark, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden, and
officials of the European Community. I am grateful for helpful comments from Knut H. Alfsen. In
addition, I want to thank Arild Underdal for his many valuable suggestions.
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12 APPENDIX 1
Member states CO2 emissions
(1990) million
tonnes
Reduction
target, in %
(reference year
1990)
CO2 emissions
million tonnes
CO2 emissions
(% of EU wide
target)
Germany 1013 -25 -253,25 -81,49
UK 577 -10 -57,7 -18,57
Italy 436,3 -7 -30,541 -9,83
The Netherlands 151,8 -10 -15,18 -4,88
Austria 59,2 -25 -14,8 -4,76
Denmark 52,1 -25 -13,025 -4,19
Belgium 114,5 -10 -11,45 -3,68
Luxembourg 13,3 -30 -3,99 -1,28
Finland 53,9 0 0 0,00
France 366,5 0 0 0,00
Sweden 61,3 5 +3,065 +0,99
Ireland 30,72 15 +4,608 +1,48
Portugal 42,5 40 +17 +5,47
Greece 86,1 30 +25,83 +8,31
Spain 227,3 17 +38,641 +12,43
Total 3285,52 - -310,792 100,00
Source: European Commission, Communication, 1996.
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